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Viability of Traditional Banking Services: 
Evidence from the Regional Level U.S. Banking Industry 
Introduction 
The commercial banking industry is the oldest financial institution in the United States. 
The three main functions of the traditional commercial banks are: the creation of money, through its 
lending and investing activities; the holding of deposits; and the provision of a mechanism for 
payments and transferring funds . (Roussakis, 1989) A federal safety net has been constructed to 
supervise, regulate and monitor the operations of banks since the banking collapse in the 1930s. 
Four different federal and state regulators with overlapping responsibilities are involved in 
preserving the safety and soundness of the banking industry. This regulatory structure 
underscores the unique position of banks in the economy. The viability of the banking industry, 
therefore, is not only important for the sustained growth of the industry itself, but also directly 
related the well-being of the nation'S economy. 
The question of how banks are doing is the perpetual concern of the federal government. 
In nearly four decades after the installment of the safety net, the banking industry enjoyed a period 
of minimum distress and high profits. Then, as the economy expanded, technological 
advancement transformed the way businesses were conducted. Since late-1960s, banks started to 
face competitions from outside the banking industry. Most of these non-bank banks! had the 
advantage over banks in that they were not suhject to the regulations imposed on banks. 
Competitive pressure forced banks to actively seek solutions on their own. Regulations that once 
brought banks much joy and prosperity now endangered their existence. Banks sought various 
ways to get around the restrictions and succeeded in raising funds through the money markets. 
The period from the early 1980s through the early 19905 marked one of the most turbulent periods 
in the U.S. banking history. As the economy went into prolonged expansion, the banking 
industry was hard hit by bad loan problem and suffered large shrinkage in its market share. The 
1 On the lending side, alternatives for bank loans come from credit unions, companies like General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation and Bond and Stock Markets. On the borrowing side, pension funds, 
money market mutual funds and annuities offered by insurance companies compete directly against the 
various deposit accounts offered by banks. (Macey and Miller, 1991) 
number of failed banks leaped to an average of 104 per year during the 1980s from an average of 
six banks per year from 1946 to 1980 (Gorton and Rosen, 1993). The number of "problem"2 
banks peaked in 1987 at nearly 1,600 and stayed at the 1,000 level through 1992 (Greenspan, 
1994). Deregulation was demanded and granted in light of the situation. As banks set out to stay 
in the competition, consolidation3 became a favorable option with its prospects of cutting cost, 
entering new markets and starting new lines of products. In the words of Hugh L. McColl Ir. 
(1991): "The U.S. banking system must wring out its excess capacity .... But the real driving 
force in the cutback in capacity will be an inevitable, sweeping consolidation."4 
Exhibit 1 is a chart showing the changes in the number of banks from 1972 to 1994. The 
number of failed banks climbed rapidly over the 1980's and peaked in 1988. It then dropped 
steadily in the first half of this decade and reached a record low in 1994. The changes in the 
number of mergers, on the other hand, grew three-folds between 1980 and 1989. In the first half 
of the 1990s, the number rebounded after an initial drop in 1990 and continued to grow. The 
reduced number of failed banks suggests that the banking industry has improved its position in this 
decade and it is indeed the case. In his statement to Congress on September 22, 1994, Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, wrote: "the 
banking system is stronger now than it has been in many years, and it seems to be well prepared to 
meet the nation's credit needs." 
The improvements observed bring forth questions such as: (1) Is the industry well on its 
feet to stay safe and competitive; (2) Has the industry squeezed out the excess capacity through the 
consolidation frenzy and restructuring; (3) What types of regulations on banking are needed in the 
1990s, more restrictions or less; etc. These questions interrelate with each other and all of them 
have strong policy implication. In this paper, I want to address the first question through my study 
of the regional level banking industries. The fifty states and the District of Columbia are divided 
2 A "problem" bank refers to a bank with serious asset quality problems, i.e., large volume of non-
performing assets such as non-accruing loans and foreclosed real estate. See Greenspan (1994) for more 
discussions on "problem" banks. 
3 By "consolidation", I am referring to the activity through which two or more banks combine their 
assets to form one bank. The activity can be a merger between compatible sized banks or an acquisition 
of one or more banks by a bank. 
4 Mr. McColl is chairman and CEO of NationsBank headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. See 
McColl (1991) for more discussions on the reform of the domestic banking system. 
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into eight regions according to the convention in the Banking Policy Report, a Journal on Trends in 
Regu lation and Supervision. The regions are: 
Region States included 
New Enoland Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamnshire, Rhode Island, Vermont. 
Mid-Atlantic District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsvlvania, Vir.inia, West Vir.inia. 
Midwest Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska. 
Central Illinois, Indiana, Kentuckv, Michi.an, Ohio, Wisconsin. 
Southeast Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee. 
Southwest Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas. 
Mountain Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wvomin •. 
Far West Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Ore.on, Washin.ton. 
The reasons for studying regional banking are discussed in the next section. 
My study focuses on testing the conduct of banks in their traditional activities, loans and 
demand deposits provision. The twenty-one year period runs from 1972 to 1992. A relatively 
recent econometric model is employed. The model takes a set of two-equation system that contains 
one demand function and one reduced-form supply equation. A parameter that references the 
deviation in the conduct of banks from the competitive equilibrium level can be estimated using the 
model. When the parameter has a value that is not significantly different from 0, banks' conduct is 
said to be competitive. A positive value indicates market power possessed by banks. Market 
power in the banking industry is not necessarily a bad thing, especially when we are concerned 
about banks' ability to sustain economic shocks. Banks will have an added level of protection with 
some market power. A negative value of the parameter is linked to disequilibrium where 
production level is beyond the competitive equilibrium level which has price equal marginal cost of 
production. This type of equilibrium is given the name "excess capacity" in a number of banking 
studies. There is, however, another definition of "excess capacity" that says firms have excess 
capacity if they operate on the downward sloping portion of their average cost curve. This second 
definition is difficult to test using my model. Therefore, I will use the phrase excess capacity with 
its first definition unless otherwise noted in the paper. My regression results suggest that the 
industry as a whole is capable of providing loans in a competitive manner. The provision of 
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demand deposits shows more diversity across the country, but there is reason to believe that banks 
are quite well prepared for competitions and shocks in that area of operation. 
The next section gives some background information of the U.S. banking industry. The 
third section is a brief survey of the literature on banking. The fourth section elaborates on the 
theoretical aspects of the study. The fifth section introduces the model and the equations involved. 
The sixth section lists the sources of data and describes the data. The seventh section discusses 
regression results. The eighth section concludes the study and makes suggestions for future 
studies. The ninth section is a collection of exhibits, including charts, description of data and 
regression outputs. The last section is the bibliography. 
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Background 
The commercial banking industry is one ofthe most highly regulated and monitored 
industries. The dual banking system of separate state and federal chartering and regulation was 
established by the National Bank Act of 1863. Banks can be chartered and supervised by state 
bank regulator or by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). In addition, two other 
federal regulators were given the power to supervise after the disastrous banking collapse in the 
early 1930s. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) was given the role of a central bank that makes 
policies regarding reserve and currency provisions. The national banks were subject to the 
supervision and regulation of both OCC and FRS. The Banking Act (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933 
and the Banking Act of 1935 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to 
provide federal insurance for balances in bank accounts for state-chartered banks. (Pierce, 1991) 
The four parts of the supervisory body for banks, which formed a federal safety net, work together 
to preserve the stability and soundness of the banking industry. 
In the 1930s, the prevailing sentiment in the government was that competition in the 
hanking industry in previous decades caused the collapse. The cost of a collapse is too high that 
regulatory measures had to be constructed to circumvent another collapse. Two major regulations, 
therefore, were put in place to maintain a level of balanced and controlled competition. One was 
the interest rate ceilings on deposits, and the other was the intrastate/interstate branching 
restrictions. The Glass-Steagal Act prohibited paying interest on demand deposits and gave the 
Federal Reserve power to determine the maximum rate on time deposits - the so-called Regulation 
Q. Up through the mid-1950s, the interest rate ceilings had minimum impact on commercial 
banks' profitability because the market interest rates were even lower and the market was 
segmented enough that banks only competed against each other in their specialties, such as 
deposits and commercial loans, 
The "credit crunch" in 1966 was the turning point in the banking history. Caught in the 
middle of the Vietnam War, with the Federal Reserve's resolution to keep inflation down, the 
market interest rates escalated. Since banks could nol raise the deposit rates above the rate ceiling, 
they lost huge amount of deposits. At the same time, the need for loans in the market was 
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growing. Banks were unable to meet all the needs of the market and many corporations turned 
away from banks and went into the commercial paper market. Consequently, the commercial 
paper market grew rapidly to compete with banks. Large banks, in an effort to free themselves 
from the constraints of the rate ceilings, started to explore the financial market for funds. 
Negotiable Certificate of Deposits (which is really short-term debt instruments) was the first to be 
sold in an organized market; and later on Eurodollars (dollar deposits in overseas branches and 
affiliates) and commercial paper of bank holding companies were widely adopted. The barriers 
between banking and financial market were broken with efforts from both outside and within the 
industry. Also, as large corporate borrowers left the banks behind, banks developed new client 
groups like the middle-market borrowers (the small businesses) and more consumers (retail 
business, credit card, for example). As the economy expanded, the regulators could no longer 
shield banks from the ever more competitive market. After several failed attempts to keep the 
barriers, the regulators gradually relinquished their positions. In 1970, the Federal Reserve 
suspended the interest rate ceiling on 90-day large CDs (Certificate of Deposits). In the next 
sixteen years, the phasing-out of Regulation Q was steadily carried out. The Federal Reserve 
completely renounced its power over rate ceilings in 1986, and subsequently stressed more 
emphasis on the reserve requirements and the market interest rates to influence the market 
allocation of funds. (Pierce, 1991) 
The regulations on intrastate/interstate banking and branching were granted to state 
authorities since the 1930s. Both state banks and national banks were subject to the same 
restrictions of the state where they were located. The main argument against branch banking has 
been that "by edging out small individual banks, it makes possible the emergence of banking 
monopolies." (Roussakis, 1989) On the other hand, the arguments in favor of branch centered on 
the issue of the advantages of economies of scale and better management. The regulations of 
different state fell into three broad categories: state-wide branching permitted; limited branching 
within geographic boundaries permitted; and only unit banks allowed with no branching permitted. 
Large banks found ways around the prohibition to conduct business across border lines. For 
example, the travelling officers would visit companies in other states to solicit business. After the 
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credit crunch crisis in 1966, larger branching banks appeared to have a competitive edge over those 
small unit banks in that large banks had a larger pool of funding and could afford to explore 
alternatives for financing their loans. Larger banks also had the advantage of having the financial 
resources to be on the forefront of technology advancement that reduced the cost to banks. As the 
economy grew and the competition got tougher, the banking industry found the need to let banks 
expand. In late 1970s, a couple of states first adopted laws allowing interstate bank acquisitions. 
Other states gradually followed the leads to adopted similar regulations. However, interstate 
branching was still prohibited and it greatly impaired banks' ability to gain significant presence in 
another state. Interstate branching laws did not come until 1982 starting with Massachusetts's 
interstate branching bill. The concept of regional banking first appeared in New England region in 
the mid-1980s when the contiguous states passed legislatures to permit banks in one state to own 
banks in another. Other parts of the country followed thereafter. Then came the move towards 
nationwide banking. As of December 1993, a third of the states still did not have nationwide 
banking laws. 
Even with the deregulation, the transformation of the banking industry into an integrated 
nation wide system any time soon is not likely. There is yet to be the first bank that operates 
nationally. The existence of some super-regional banks is a start. Banks like Chase-Manhattan 
and CitiBank of Mid-Atlantic, Norwest of Midwest, Banc One of the Central region, NationsBank 
of the Southeast region and Bank of America of Far West are representatives of national players. 
However, even these banks' operations are approximately focused on one or two regions. For 
example, CitiBank may have some offices in Ohio, but the Ohio market is nevertheless dominated 
by regional banks such as Banc One, Key Corp, etc. One other point about regional banking is 
that reports on regional banking show varied growth trend in different regions, with a strong link 
to the performance of regional economy (Banking Policy Report, 1992). 
Exhibit 2 illustrates a cross-region comparison of the changes in total number of banks 
from 1972 to 1992. As shown in the exhibit, although the national trend is definitely a decrease in 
the total number of banks during the period, each region has had very distinct features. For 
example, in the Southwest, the total number increased significantly during the early 1980s and then 
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fell dramatically around 1986; the Far West had, in fact, seen the total number increase over the 
twenty-one year period. A further investigation shows that the reduction in total number of banks 
came mostly from unit banks around the nation. Exhibit 3 shows the changes in the number of 
unit banks vs. branching banks between 1972 and 1994. As we can see that the number of unit 
banks reduced more than half over the time span while the number of branching banks grew by a 
quarter in 1994 relative to 1972. The movement towards more branching banks shows a sign of 
willingness to integrate the market. However, it is at best the beginning of a long journey towards 
national integration. At this point, studying the regional or even the state level industry appears to 
be more appropriate. 
As elaborated above, the major changes in the industry did not take place until the early 
I 970s. The changes touched every aspect of the banking industry, ranging from deregulation to 
technological break-through to fund resources to client groups. My data set (1972-1992) 
approximately captures the most eventful years of the industry. The results will reveal how well 
the industry has managed to react to the market demand and stayed competitive. 
8 
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Survey of Literature 
Prior to 1984, most studies have adopted one of two approaches to evaluate the 
performances of banks. These two approaches were surveyed carefully and analyzed extensively 
in "Bank Market Structure and Competition, A Survey" by R. Alton Gilbert (1984). 
In the survey, Gilbert first identified two approaches. One approach was to test the 
structure-performance hypothesis about the relationship between the degree of concentration in the 
market and the measures of bank performance. The second approach focused on cost structure of 
banks to estimate the influence of bank size and organizational form on the operating costs of 
banks. Gilbert was skeptical about the first approach because of two problems that could lessen 
the significance of the findings. One problem was that these studies gave little discussion of the 
theoretical basis for the regression model used. The other problem was that potential effects of 
regulations on the market structure were overlooked, which cast doubt on the relevance of the 
findings to the industry. With respect to the second approach, Gilbert· found the theoretical 
development on a cost structure model encouraging, but the focus of the studies not broad enough 
to make substantial contribution to government regulations on banks. 
The criticisms on the structure-performance paradigm in Gilbert's survey was countered by 
Arnold A. Heggestad in his comment on Gilbert's paper. While Heggestad agreed with Gilbert on 
the problems associated with the literatures Gilbert surveyed, he identified the theoretical basis of 
the method used in structure-performance tests and declared that the model was useful in studying 
the banking industry. In view offuture developments in the banking industry, Heggestad 
proposed seven areas of studies for researchers. Some of the proposals have since been studied. 
For example, Gorton and Rosen (1992) studied the corporate control considerations of 
management and the moral hazard problem associated with fixed-fee deposit insurance6. Their 
findings suggested that managerial entrenchment, more than moral hazard, explained the 
declination of the banking industry in the 1980s. Hunter and Timme (1986,1991) tested the 
5 The word IIperformance", in this context, is equivalent to "efficiency", which refers to the 
effectiveness and competitiveness of banks in transforming resources into various financial services. 
6 The hypothesis of moral hazard says that because of the fixed-fee deposit insurance policy on 
banking which guarantees the safety of the banks, they have less incentive to maintain high standards 
in providing quality products (Gorton and Rosen, 1992). 
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diffusion of technological change and its impact on productive efficiency. They found that 
technological change lowered real cost in banks of all size. There were significant production 
economies in bank financial intermediation, which implied that allowing bank mergers to create 
larger banks would not necessarily bring about inefficiency. 
Since the structure-performance methods were not well accepted, new approaches are 
needed to provide meaningful comparisons. One focus among researchers in developing 
alternative models is to look for the potential that consolidations have in achieving scale economy, 
eliminating excess capacity and hence generating greater efficiency in the banking indusl:J.y. 
The argument that the economy of scale can be achieved is based on the assumption that 
excess capacity exists in the induslly and by combining banks the average cost of production will 
be lowered as fixed costs are spread over a greater volume of output. (Berger, Hanweck and 
Humphrey, 1987) This argument gives the first definition of excess capacity, which says that 
some banks are operating at the region where the average cost curve is downward sloping. Hence 
there are unexploited positive returns associated with increasing the level of output. Conversely, it 
is possible to produce the same amount of aggregate output at a lower cost if a smaller number of 
banks can each produce a larger volume of output. The pressure to create larger banks, however, 
depends on the level of competition in the market. The reduction in cost may be achieved if the 
output and internal structure of each bank are compatible. 
A survey that has been widely cited and is relevant to this issue is "Why Do Estimates of 
Bank Scale Economies Differ?" by David B. Humphrey (1990) which investigated various 
methodologies used for estimating scale economy. In the survey, Humphrey concluded previous 
studies on scale economy and identified some problems with research design. The argument that 
larger banks are more efficient than smaller banks due to scale economy was not supported by the 
findings from several studies. It appeared that some of the smaller large banks possess economies 
and the very largest ones seem to posses diseconomies. This implied that greater competition 
within the banking induslly need not be associated with bank size. Among the problems related to 
research design, Humphrey found that: (1) use of operating cost gives bias toward finding scale 
economies, and thus should be replaced by the use of total cost; (2) linear (Cobb-Douglas) form 
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gives bias, while the translog form (quadratic form) captures variations of scale economies across 
different sizes of banks; (3) evaluation for average banking office is not relevant for policy 
purposes and hence could be ignored. These three points provided useful criteria for selecting 
variables and functional forms in cost studies'? 
A direct approach to check this possibility is recorded in "Investigating the Banking 
Consolidation Trend" by John Boyd and Stanley Graham (1991). They found that neither scale 
economy nor excess capacity was strong enough a factor to be accounted for as the force behind 
the consolidation. What does seem to drive the trend is in fact the realization of market power. 
" ... there is evidence of some ability for banks for earn monopoly rents, at least in some markets" 
(Boyd and Graham, 1991). Questions about the policies towards banking were raised based on 
the study results. If there is neither excess capacity to eliminate nor scale economy to gain, the 
consolidations of banks should not be encouraged through the relaxation of government policies. 
In concluding their paper, the authors wrote: "We see scant evidence that further banking 
consolidation will benefit either the U.S. banking industry or the U.S. economy." (Boyd and 
Graham, 1991) They assembled conclusions from other studies and employed empirical data on 
banking to support their arguments. The one thing lacking in this paper is an econometric model to 
test the data. Nevertheless, this paper presented a well argued case against the industrial trend and 
brought up further debates in this subject. 
The model used in this paper does not involve an estimation of the difference between 
average cost and demand; therefore, it does not differentiate market power and the above defined 
excess capacity (scale economy). It does, however, provide specific estimation of excess capacity 
in another sense. In this case, excess capacity is associated with disequilibrium where production 
level is beyond the competitive eqUilibrium (Shaffer, 1993). This definition is compatible to the 
definition by Gorton and Rosen (1992), which links excess capacity to level of the aggregate 
volume of loans exceeding the amount at which marginal profit turns negative. This type of excess 
capacity is not likely to exist in the long run, when the disparity between market demand and 
7 The translog ~ost fun~tion was developed by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau. More discussion on this 
function is in the next section where the model is defined. For more information on the translog cost 
function, see Hay and Morris (1991). 
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supply will drive the market price down and cause a major cut-back in the supply by banks. Less 
supply requires less inputs and hence there will be the need to cut costs. Consolidation is one of 
the several measures that is assumed to possess the ability to lower costs. The observation on the 
banking industry in the 1980s does not rule out the possibility of this kind of disequilibrium having 
taken place. 
A series of studies on the US banking industry were done by Sberrill Shaffer (1989, 1993, 
1994,1995). In his 1989 study, he found competitive conduct across the industry for the period 
from 1941-1983. A cross-country study in 1994 suggested noncompetitive conduct during the 
period 1979-1991. The most recent study (1995) examined the period 1934-1992. The findings 
indicated a small amount of excess capacity in bank loans was eliminated after 1984, but 
substantial market power in demand deposits arose around that time (Shaffer, 1995). 
As discussed in the previous section, I take Shaffer's work a step further to look at the 
conduct of the banking industries on the regional level. 
12 
The Theory 
This study is based on a structural econometric model that uses observations on industrial 
prices and quantities to estimate the deviation of marginal revenue from competitive price and hence 
identifies a parameter indexing the degree of competitiveness of an industry. 
The industrial organization theory of profit maximizing firms indicates that the level of 
production that firms choose (in this case, banks) is determined by the intersection of the marginal 
cost of production and the banks' perceived marginal revenue. In the case of perfect competitive 
market, the market demand curve that firms face coincides with the industry's marginal revenue 
curve. Thus at the equilibrium of demand and supply, the marginal cost equals the marginal 
revenue as well as the market price, i.e., MC = MR = P. When there is some degree of market 
power, the marginal revenue curve will be lower than the demand curve (as shown in the graph), 
which implies that marginal cost and marginal revenue will be lower than price, i.e., MC = MR < 
P. 
The industry's marginal revenue function is represented by P + h(), where 
h(·) = Q. (iJp I iJQ) < 0 is the semi-elasticity of market demand and a function of demand side 
parameters and exogenous variables. A bank's marginal revenue is P + A • h() where A is a 
parameter indexing the degree of market power of the average bank in the industry. In other 
words, A shows the extent to which average firms recognize the difference between price and 
marginal revenue. A = 0 implies on average the firms are providing services and products 
competitively according to market demand. A = I, on the other hand, indicates that monopoly 
behavior (market power) exists. This may happen when all the competing firms form a perfect 
cartel to act like a monopoly. Any value of A between 0 and I corresponds to various degrees of 
imperfect competition and marks the existence of some level of market power. (Bresnahan, 1982) 
To identify A econometrically, a demand equation and a reduced-form supply equation are 
used. The demand function is Q = f( P, Z, a), where Q is the quantity of the outputs, P is the 
price of the outputs, Z is a vector of exogenous variables and a is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The supply equation takes the form of P = -A. h() + Me. Bresnahan (1982) and 
Lau (1982) have shown that in order to identify A, Q = f(P, Z, a) must not be separable in Z, 
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: 
which means the demand function cannot be linear and has to include interaction terms such as PZ. 
In other words, the function h(.) should be Q. (()P / ()Q) = h(Q,Z, a) , in which Z is included as 
exogenous variables.8 
Shaffer (1993, 1994, 1995) introduced a new interpretation to 1\.. Aside from reflecting 
the possible price deviation from the competitive price that an average bank in the industry may 
observe, I\. also gives a linear approximation of the percentage deviation of industry output from 
the competitive level. -I\.. Q. (()P / ()Q) represents the difference between the actual price from 
8 Bresnahan (1982) gave a graphiC illustration of the condition imposed on the demand function, which 
is briefed below. For an econometric proof, see Lau (1982). 
In the figure, MCc is the marginal cost curve for competitive banks and MCm is the marginal cost curve 
for banks in a cartel. DiS and MRiS (i=I,2,3) are demand curves and the marginal revenue curves and the 
marginal cost curves are twice as steep as the demand curves. In the case of Dl and MRl, El can be both 
the equilibrium situation for perfect competition and a cartel or monopoly. If the demand function is 
linear, then changing the value of Z will only shift the demand curve and the marginal revenue curve. 
D2 and MR2 represent one possible shift. As shown here, E2 is in the same position as El, which 
represents the equilibrium situation for both perfect competition and a cartel. Thus, only shifting the 
demand and the marginal revenune curve cannot tell perfect competition from a ·cartel. Some exogenous 
variables must be able to change the slope of the curves. When Dl and MRI are rotated to D3 and MR3, 
the equilibrium situation for perfect competition and a cartel no longer have the same output level. In 
the perfect competition case, the equilibrium stays at El; while in the cartel case, the equilibrium 
moves to E3. [t is through the rotation that I\. is identified. In order to rotate the curves, the 
interaction effects between P and Z have to be included in the demand function. Therefore, the demand 







the competitive price. With the assumption that the demand curve is continuous and the demand 
function is twice differentiable, multiplying -A. Q. (dP / dQ) by (dQ / dP ) gives the deviation 
in quantity from the competitive level and the value is -A. Q. Dividing -A. Q by Q gives A, 
which indexes the percentage deviation in quantity from the competitive level. 
This interpretation of A makes it possible to explain the value of A that is outside the range 
[0, I], which implies disequilibrium. Changes in regulation, such as the deregulation on entry 
barrier, may cause disquilibrium in the short run. The length of the short run depends on how 
long it takes for banks to evaluate the market and adjust the level of output. But during the period 
before a new long run equilibrium is reached, the aggregate output level could drive the price down 
to below the average bank's marginal cost. When this happens, A becomes negative. Shaffer 
(1993) reported such a case in the Canadian banking industry following the 1980 revisions to the 
Canadian Bank Act. Similar regulatory change has happened in the U.S. in the last decade. With 
the deregulation of interstate banking, it is possible to observe such disequilibrium in regions 
where regional giant banks appeared but recently. If A takes a value greater than 1, it shows that 
the banks' objectives are not profit maximizing because the aggregate output level in this case will 
be lower than in the monopoly equilibrium. It is possible if banks adopted a cost-plus pricing 
method ex ante and were unable to make adjustment in output level when sudden drop in price 
occurred ex post. 
Because this model uses only the aggregated data on the banking industry, it does not in 
any way rely on the structure of the market for identifying A. "Estimates of A are unbiased as 
long as each observation represents a bank or group of banks spanning at least one complete 
market." (Shaffer, 1995) In this sense, the model can be applied to any types of markets. With 
the aggregated data of that market, the difference in price between the market studied and a 
competitive market with the same level of output can be identified. 
The limitation of this model comes from the same source that makes the model useful. 
Since the model looks at the overall banking industry with aggregated data of banks of all size, it is 
not able to explain more firm-specific questions about the competitiveness of individual firms in the 
industry. To understand each firm, alternative models are needed. 
15 
The Model 
Based on the theory described in the previous section, to obtain A, two functions are 
specified. The demand function follows Bresnahan (1982) and Shaffer (1993, 1995). Alternative 
demand functions (such as the translog function) were used in Shaffer's cross-country study. 
However, the translog form greatly increases the complexity of the model and adds more difficulty to 
estimating the coefficients in a simultaneous equation system. Shaffer found no significant advantage 
in using the more flexible form for demand equation given the conditions associated with the demand 
function. In addition, a technical problem involving the specifications of the dummy variables makes 
it harder to interprete the regression results from a demand equation in the translog form. Therefore, 
the demand function is specified as 
(I) Qit = ao + a,Pit + a2GRPit + a3TBILL. + a.Pit * GRPit 
+aSPit * TBILL, + a6GRPit • TBILL, + e 
where Qit = the dollar value of the quantity of banking outputs for region i in year t, 
Pit = the total earning on the outputs divided by the value of the outputs for 
region j in year t,. 
GRPit = the gross regional products for region i in year t, 
TBILLI = the treasury bill rate in year t .. 
Pit *GRPit. Pit *TBILLt and GRPil*TBILLt are interaction terms for identifying A as explained 
in the previous section. The restrictions posed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) require that 
coefficients for Pit *GRPi/, and Pit *TBILLI can not both be O. GRPit, is a measure of the level 
of regional economy, which is assumed to have a positive influence on the level of outputs. Thus, 
the coefficient for GRPit, is expected to be positive. TB/LLI is used as the price of substitute 
goods for bank output. When output is measured as loans, I expect the coefficient for TB/LLt to 
be positive. From the point of view of liquidity, to obtain liquid assets investor can either borrow 
from the banks or sell their holdings of investments. Higher rate on treasury bill implies lower 
value, thus the investor would keep on holding treasury bill and seek bank loans. Therefore, when 
the treasury bill rate goes up, the demand for loans should go up as well. When output is 
measured as demand deposits, however, I expect the coefficient to be negative. The reason is that 
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when the treasury bill rate is up, the price of treasury bill should decrease, which makes investing 
into treasury bill attractive. Thus cash flows out of deposit accounts and flows into treasury bills. 
(0 is an econometric error term. Differentiating both sides of the equation (1) with respect to P 
gives: 
(2) iJQ" I iJP" = a, + a.Y" + a,Z, 
Therefore, the semi-elasticity of demand function becomes: 
(3) h(Y", Z" a) = Q" I (~ + a.Y" + a,Z,) 
On the other hand, a trans log total cost function is used for deriving the marginal cost 
function. The translog function is chosen because there is no restriction imposed on the cost 
function by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), thus the cost function is free to use any form. 
Moreover, in the banking studies, this cost function has been used most frequently due to its 
flexible form (see Berger et al., 1987; Hunter and Timme, 1986 and 1991 ; Shaffer, 1993, 1994, 
1995; Berg and Kim, 1994). The total cost function is: 
(4) 
J J 
In Te" = {30 + {3q InQ;, + 1I2{3qq(lnQ;,i + L{3j In Wj + 1I 2LL{3ij In W,Wj + L{3q; InQ" In Wj , 
j=l i j j=1 
where TC is total cost, J is the total number of inputs, Wj is the price of input j which is calculated 
by dividing the annual expenditure on input j by the total amount of the input used. One 
assumption employed here is that WjS are not correlated with Q. The three inputs identified in this 
study are average salary per full-time employee, average deposit rate paid on interest bearing 
deposits (time and savings deposits, excluding demand deposits), and the price of physical capital 
which equals the total expenses on physical capital over the total dollar value of physical capital. 
There are several conditions imposed on this translog function. These conditions do not 
interfere with the conditions attached to the demand function in this study. Because the total cost is 
expected to increase proportionately relative to the proportionate increase in all inputs, three 
conditions are necessary: L{3j = 1; L{3qj = 0; and L{3,j = L{3ji (Hay and Morris, 1991). As 
j ] J J 
shown below, the condition that is relevant to the marginal cost is L{3qj = 0, linear homogeneity 
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in factor prices. This condition is imposed in the estimation by taking one input out of the 
equation. Differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to InQ gives: 
J 
(5) d(ln TC,,) , d(lnO,,) = (dTC" , TC,,) I (do.. 'QiJ) = f3, + f32lno.. + Lf3j In Wj . 
j=1 
The above equation is the base for the marginal cost function in my estimation. The function is: 
(6) MCiI = dTC,,' dQ" = (TC,,' Q,,)(bo + bl lnO" + b2 ln Wage" + b3 ln Wdep,,), 
where MCit = the marginal cost of providing the output for region i in year t, 
TCit = the total cost of providing the output for region i in year t, 
Wageit = the average salary per full-time employee for region i in year t, 
WdePit = the average deposit rate on all earning deposits for region i in year t. 
In equation (6), the price of physical capital is not included to impose the restriction on linear 
homogeneity on factor prices. 
Shaffer (1995) pointed out that the use of a scalar measure of output (TCiIQit) in equation 
(6) technically requires the banking cost function to be separable in inputs and outputs; or b2 and 
b3 should be O. However, he argued that the compatible results from his study and from other 
multi-output studies suggested that even when this condition is violated, the properties of scalar-
output estimates still approximated findings in other studies. 
As described in the previous section, an average bank's marginal revenue is 
MR = P + Ah() = P + AQ / (dO / uP). Based on profit-maximizing theory, MC=MR, 
assembling equations (3) and (6) gives: 
(7) (TC" 'Q,,)(bo + bllnQiI + b2 ln Wage" + b3 ln WdePiI)' 
= Pil + (LA,D,) * 0.,' (al + a.YiI + a,Z,) 
Rearranging equation (7) gives a reduced form supply relation function: 
(8) Pit = -(LA,D,) * 0.,' (al + a.YiJ + a,Z,) 
+(TC,,' O,,)(bo + b,lno.. + b2 1n Wage" +b3 ln WdePiI) +.u 
where .u is an econometric error term. To reflect the cross-equation restrictions of the exogenous 
variables in the demand equation, the pair of equations (1) and (8) is estimated simultaneously. 
In equations (7) and (8), the term L A,D, replaces the single A term. Ai ,is A for region 
i. Di represents the dummy variable for region i. Di is of value 1 when the data for its region i is 
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used and takes the value 0 if the data for other regions is used. L A,D, enters into the equation (8) 
interactively with the function h(Y",Z" a) = Qit I (a, + a4 Y" + a,Z,). Because the value of 
Qit I (a, + a.Y" + a,Z,) varies by region and by year, eight dummy variables are needed in the 
model to identify Ai for each region. The structure of the model determines that singularity 
problem does not apply. Thus, in equation (8), the first term becomes: 
-(A,D, + A2D2 + A3D3 + A4D. + AsD, + A6D6 + A7D7 + AsDs) * Qit I (a, + a4Yit + a,Zit). 
The output specifications in this study require special elaboration. The measurement of 
output in the banking industry is a highly debated issue. Traditionally, two approaches were 
developed. The first one is called the production approach. In this case, banks are considered 
producers and providers of loan and deposit accounts; therefore, output is measured by the number 
of these accounts or the number of transactions carried out for all products. Total costs are 
measured as all operating costs incurred to produce these accounts. The problems related to this 
production approach are: (1) it ignores the interest payments as a part of costs; (2) there lacks a 
good method to apply weights to different accounts; and (3) it is difficult to collect accurate data on 
the number of transactions. (Colwell and Davis, 1992) Mostly due to the data availability, the 
production approach has not been used much in recent years. 
The second approach is called the intermediation approach. This approach uses the dollar 
value of loans, deposits and other assets as the measures of output. Variations in the specification 
of this approach have been categorized into three sub-approaches: (1) the asset approach which 
uses bank loans and other assets as output; (2) the user-cost approach which uses outputs that 
contribute to net revenue and thus includes demand deposits as output; and (3) the value-added 
approach which includes all activities that create high added values for banle Wheelock and 
Wilson (1995) mentioned that the user-cost approach and the value-added approach empirically 
tend to suggest similar classifications of inputs and outputs. The main difference appears to be the 
use of demand deposits only as an output in user-cost approach but as both an. output and an input 
in value-added approach. 
In their study "Evaluating the Efficiency of Commercial Banks: Does Our View of What 
Banks Do Matter?", David Wheelock and Paul Wilson (1995) compared the outcome of bank 
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efficiency tests using the different approaches detailed above. They applied a single-estimation 
technique to a sample of banks with five ways of specifying output and input. The varied results 
they got from the five estimations suggested that the measured inefficiency and the ranking of 
banks were sensitive to the researcher's view of what banks do. Their finding also shows the 
importance of using alternative specifications in banking studies to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the research. 
In this study, therefore, I use four different specifications of output which follows the 
example by Shaffer (1995). The four specifications correspond to the asset approach and the user-
cost approach. In the asset approach, Q is set as the dollar value of total earning assets (the sum of 
total loans and other earning assets, e.g., investment securities) and total loans alternately and P is 
gross revenue per dollar of these assets. There is reason to suspect that muiti-collinearity problem 
might exist in the use of total earning assets. Treasury bill makes up a part of the investment 
security that is included in the total earning assets of banks. The portion of treasury bills in the 
total earning assets may be negligible or it may be large enough to make correlation between the 
return on assets and the treasury bill rate significantly different from O. The regression results 
seem to confirm my suspicion. In the future, an alternative rate for the treasury bill rate, such as 
the stock market return rate, will be useful. 
In the user-cost approach, demand deposit is included as an output as well. Under this 
approach, the service charge on demand deposit is viewed as the price customers pay to buy the 
services provided by the banks. With this specification, a four-equation system is estimated. Two 
of them are demand equations, one for total earning assets (or total loans) and the other for demand 
deposits: 
(9) Qw = aGo + aa'P'it + aa2GRP" + a~TBILL, 
+aa.P", * GRP" + aaSP,it * TBILL, + aa6GRP" * TBILL, + £, 
(10) Q2i1 = abo + ab,P2• + ab2GRPiI + ab3TBILL, 
+ab'P2it * GRP" + abSP2i, * TBIL£, + ab6GRP" * TBILL, + £2 
The other two are the reduced form supply equations. With the added output, the translog total 
cost function becomes: 
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(II) In TC = fJo + fJq,lnQ, + II 2fJqq ,(lnQ,)2 + fJq21nQ2 + II 2fJqq2(lnQ2)2 . 
J J 
+ L,fJjln Wj + 11 2L,L,fJ'j In W,Wj + L,fJqjlnQIn Wj 
j=1 i j i ==1 
The marginal cost functions with respect to QI and Q2 become: 
(12) MC,,, = dTCit I dQ,it 
= (TCit I QIit)(bao +ba, InQII, +ba2lnQ2it +ba, In Wage,it +ba.1n Wdepli') 
(13) MC2" = dTCit I dQ2it 
= (TCit I Q2it )(bbo + bb,ln Q2i' + bb2lnQ3i' + bb3 1n Wage2it + bb.ln WdeP2',) 
Thus, the reduced form supply functions are: 
( 14) Plit = -(L,A.liDli ) * QIit I (aa, + aa4 Y" + aa,Z,) 
+(TC,. I Q",)(bao +ba,lnQIi' + ba, InQ2it + ba, In Wage,it +ba4 1n WdePIit) + /1, 
(15) P2it =-(L,A.2,D2)*Q2it I (ab, +ab'Yit +ab,Z,) 
+(TCit I Q2it)(bbo +bb,lnQ2'. +bb2InQIi. +bb3 1n Wage2it +bb.ln WdeP2") + /12 
Equations (9), (10), (14) and (15) are estimated simultaneously to impose the cross-equation 
restrictions. 
Hunter and Timme (1991) identified a set of output and input for a value-added approach. 
They used the dollar value of total loans and the dollar value of produced deposits (including 
demand, time and savings deposits) as their outputs. For inputs, they identified price of labor, 
price of capital and interest price of funds . Due to the lack of revenue information from time and 





The Historical Statistics on Banking, 1934-1994 by state from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the primary source of data for this study. The Federal Reserve 
Economics Data (FRED) gives indices for the economy, such as the Gross Domestic Product 
deflator (base year 1990), the various government bond rates, and the Consumer Price Index. The 
Survey of Current Business (SCB) monthly journal reports Gross State Product for the period of 
1972-1992. Gross Regional Product is obtained through aggregating GSP of each state in the 
region. 
The total number of observations in this study is 168, with 21 observations per region for 
all eight regions. Exhibits 4-11 give the summary statistics on the variables used in this study by 
region. Each exhibit also contains two charts. The chart on the left shows the changes in the 
output level over the twenty-one year period. The Y-axis labels the deflated billion dollar amount 
of the output. The X-axis labels the year. The top line represents total earning assets, the middle 
line represents total loans and leases, and the bottom line represents demand deposits. The chart 
on the right shows the changes in return on output. The Y-axis labels the return on per dollar 
output and the X-axis still labels the year. The top line in this chart represents return on total loans 
and leases, the middle line represents return on total earning assets, and the bottom line represents 
return on demand deposits. 
These charts reveal the normal quantity and price relationship for the three types of bank 
outputs. As the return on output (the price of the outputs) decreases, the output volume increases; 
and vice versa. This relationship is observed for all three types of outputs included in the study. 
Both earning assets and loans grew throughout the 1980s for all regions except for the Southwest 
region. Correspondingly, the price of these two outputs were dropping steadily. On the other 
hand, demand deposits moved along a falling curve for all regions while the price of the deposits 
climbed upwards. Total earning assets and total loans and leases move in parallel, though the 
return on loans appears to fluctuate on a larger scale over time. The only instance where the 
inverse quantity-price relationship does not follow is for the Mid-Atlantic region during the turn of 
thi s decade. The charts on Exhibit 5 show that during that period, both the output level and return 
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on output for assets and loans decreased. This abnormal situation might be explained by the 
economic condition during that period in the Mid-Atlantic region. According to Bankin~ Policy 
Report (February 17, 1992): "Banks in the Mid-Atlantic region have been hit hard and are laboring 
under the burdens of a sharp downturn, especially in the commercial real estate sector." Therefore, 
the worsened economy around that period could have kept borrowers away even with the cuts in 
loan rates. 
A brief look at the data seems to suggest that the regional banking industries have been 
quite responsive to the changes in the market, except for unexpected shocks in the economy, such 
as the Mid-Atlantic experience mentioned above. The charts also show that although the growth 
trends for each region have been moving in the same direction, the actual scale of changes does 
differ from one region to the next. An econometric approach is necessary to obtain a logical and 
systematic answer to describe the conduct of each regional industry. 
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The Regression Results 
For the estimation, the SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) procedure in TSP (Time 
Series Processor) is used to carry out the estimations.9 "The SUR method involves generalized 
least-squares estimation and achieves an improvement in efficiency by taking into explicit account 
the fact that cross-equation error correlation may not be zero." (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991) In 
my model, it is safe to assume that the error terms for the two equations are correlated. Thus, 
SUR is used to impose the cross-sectional constraint on my nonlinear simultaneous equations 
model. lO Convergence was achieved in less than 50 iterations for each estimation. The results are 
shown in Exhibits 12-15. 
Estimates for all four models seem to fit well. Eight out of the twelve R2s calculated are 
over 0.80 Three others have a value near 0.70. Only one is below 0.60 at 0.5655 for the reduced 
form equation in the two-equation intermediation model with total loans and leases as the output. 
With one exception, the signs for the non-dummy coefficients in the demand equations are as 
expected. The exception appears in the two-equation asset model with total earning assets as 
output (Exhibit 12). The sign of the coefficient for the treasury bill rate is the opposite of what I 
have expected. It is not surprising to see this outcome. As discussed in my model section (page 
16-17), the return on total earning assets is likely to be correlated with the treasury bill rates. The 
high R2 value and low t-statistics in the table strongly suggest multi-collinearity. The noise in the 
data could have affected the estimation. 
The coefficient for GRP (the gross regional product) is statistically significant in all 
estimations and it takes on a positive value. The significance of this result is that it shows that the 
output level of banks is positively correlated with the economic level in the region. For exarnple, 
on Exhibit 13, the estimate of the coefficient for GRP is 0.238235 and it is statistically significant 
at I % level. This value tells me that when there is an one billion dollar (in real dollar, adjusted by 
9 Shaffer (1994) recommended using Marquardt algorithm in statistical package SAS's Proc SYSNLIN 
for making the estimates because the experiments conducted to compare the regression results from 
different statistical packages gave him reason to believe that SAS provides the best estimation tools 
for the model used in this study. SAS is not available for this study. 
10 Another procedure FIML (full information maximum likelihood) is used to test the robustness of the 
estimation. FIML's estimation is very sensitive regarding the starting values for the coefficients. 
When the estimates from SUR are used as starting values, FIML gives similar results as SUR. On the 
other hand, when the starting values are randomly selected, FIML produces poor fits. 
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1990 ODP deflator) increase in the gross regional product, ceteris paribus, I can be 99% 
confident that the dollar value of total loans provided in the region will increase by .238235 billion. 
The coefficients for the cost functions are more difficult to interpret, because of the ratio 
TCIQ that interacts with each variable in the parentheses in equation (6). The intercept term is 
significantly different from 0 in all four estimation but the user-cost model with loans and deposits 
as outputs. It means the ratio is a good indicator of the changes in marginal cost. As mentioned in 
the model section, use of the scalar measure of output may require the coefficients for the prices of 
input factors to be O. A brief look at the results reveals that most of the coefficients are 
significantly different from O. I think the reason for the outcome lies in the specification of the 
variables. As mentioned early, after the credit crunch, banks started seeking other means of 
financing their loan activities so that they would be less dependent on deposits. They found the 
solution in the money markets. I did not include any variables that reflect the change in cost 
structure, but the omission might have added more significance to the variables used in the model. 
Another missing variable that may prove to be important is something that would reflect the 
technological changes over the years. It is not clear to me what kind of variable might be 
appropriate to proxy for the changes, but the omission of such a variable could also contribute to 
the inflated significance of the remaining variables. These two points can be addressed in future 
researches. 
Two conditions can be examined to see if the model is sound. One condition is that the 
estimated demand curves for banking services should be downward sloping. The first order 
condition of the demand equation with respect to P gives aQ / ap = a, + a4Y + asZ. Using the 
estimates of aI, a4 and a5, I get negative value for all observations. Thus the demand curves do 
slope downwards. The second condition is whether the banking services behave as normal 
goodsll. The first order condition of the demand equation with respect to Y (ORP, a measure of 
people's living standards) gives dQ / dY = a, + a4Q+ a6Z. Using the estimates of a2, a4 and a6, 
a2 + a4Q + a6Z should be positive for all observations. Substituting in the estimated coefficients 
yield a positive value for all observations. Therefore, the two conditions are both met. Further 
11 Normal goods are goods that receive higher demand when people's income increases. 
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robustness tests can also be conducted witb alternative specifications of tbe explanatory variables in 
tbe model. 
Having discussed tbe coefficients for exogenous variables, I now move to look at tbe 
estimates for Ai s. The specification of the model links an insignificant estimate of A to perfect 
competition. I will go tbough all four Exhibits next. 
Exhibit 12 & 13 report estimates for tbe two-equation intermediation model witb eitber total 
earning assets or total loans and leases as output. None of tbe regional conduct parameters A s is 
significantly different from 0 using eitber specifications of output. Based on tbe discussion in tbe 
previous paragraph, it is reasonable to conclude tbat all eight regional banking industries were 
competitive in handling their earning assets or loans. In tbe cases of assets, tbe estimates for New 
England and Mid-Atlantic are positive, while tbe estimates for tbe remaining of tbe regions are 
negative. The sign of tbe estimates implies tbat New England and Mid-Atlantic regions might have 
had slight market power while tbe otber six regions might have had some degree of excess 
capacity. In the cases of loans, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest and Far West regions take on a positive 
estimate while tbe rest of tbe regions have negative estimates. Putting tbe regions togetber, a 
reasonable assessment of the u.s. banking industry would say that tbe industry as a whole 
showed significant signs of perfect competition in its traditional output market, witb signs of slight 
excess capacity in some regions. This finding corresponds witb tbe results Shaffer (1995) 
reported. 
Exhibits 14-15 contain tbe results for the four-equation user-cost model witb eitber total 
earning assets or total loans and leases as one output and demand deposits as anotber output. In 
eitber regression tbere are more estimates witb significant t-statistics than in tbe intermediation 
approach. Exhibit 14 shows that six regions appear competitive in gaining return on assets. The 
Mid-Atlantic has a small degree of market power significant at 0.10 level and tbe Mountain region 
has excess capacity (witb a negative estimate) significant at 0.05 level. Witb tbe demand deposit as 
output, on tbe otber hand, more deviations from tbe competitive level are detected. New England 
and tbe Soutbeast have significant market power (positive estimates) at 0.01 level; tbe Midwest has 
market power but witb less significant t-statistic at 0.10 level; and tbe Mountain region has excess 
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capacity (with a negative estimate) at 0.01 significance level. The other four regions appear to be 
competitive with estimates that are not significantly different from O. Exhibit 15 paints a similar 
picture as Exhibit 14 with less number of significant estimates. In this model, total loans and 
leases replaced total earning assets. The regional estimates for loans are all non-significant except 
for the Mountain region which shows excess capacity in its handling of loans significant at 0.01 
level. For deposits, New England shows market power at 0.01 significance level; the Southeast 
has slight market power at 0.05 significance level; and the Mountain region again has excess 
capacity significant at 0.01 level. The other five regions have estimates that are not significantly 
different from O. 
In general, the conduct of each region in providing banking outputs is as follows. New 
England was competitive in its assets and loans supply, but appears to have had market power over 
the demand deposit supply (since both estimates have 0.01 significance level, the positive estimates 
should be accepted). The Mid-Atlantic appears to have been competitive in supplying all three 
outputs (although the Mid-Atlantic has a positive estimate for assets in the user-cost model, the 
significance level of 0.10 is not convincing given the serial correlation problem discussed earlier). 
The Central, Southwest and Far West regions had competitive output supply for all specifications. 
The Midwest has one estimate significant for its demand deposit supply in the user-cost model with 
assets and deposits; however, the estimate is significant only at 0.10 level, so it can be rejected. 
The Southeast was in the same position as New England with significant (at 0.05 and 0.01 level) 
market power over the demand deposit supply. The Mountain region had significant excess 
capacity in all three outputs using the user-cost model. The significance levels are either 0.05 or 
0.01. The estimates from the intermediation model are not significant, but they do have a negative 
sign. Therefore, it is very likely that excess capacity existed in the Mountain region. 
The DW statistics reported by SUR suggests serial correlation problem in my data. 
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991): "Serial correlation will not affect the unbiasedness or 
consistency of ordinary least-squares regression estimators, but it does affect their efficiency. In 
the case of positive serial correlation, this loss of efficiency will be masked by the fact that the 
estimates of the standard errors obtained from the least-squares regression will be smaller than the 
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true standard errors." Therefore, the estimates reported here are unbiased, but they are not 
efficient. The above mentioned R 2 values are inflated due to the smaller value of the standard 
errors; same can be said about the t-statistics. In other words, when an estimate is found to be 
significant with a large t -statistic, questions should be raised with respect to how reliable is this 
finding. On the other hand, if an estimate is not significantly different from 0 (when t-statistic is 
low), then the conclusion remains valid even when positive serial correlation exists. This is an 
econometric problem that requires more work in the future. 
Another area of interest for future study is the possible shift in conduct during the period 
studied. As shown in the charts on Exhibits 4-11, three patterns can be identified in the changes in 
output level for these regions. Both in New England and the Southeast, the accelerated expansions 
in output level appear to start around 1980. In the Mid-Atlantic, Central and Far West, there seem 
to be a big turn around in mid-1970s. For the Mid West, Southwest and Mountain, no significant 
change in trends is visible from the charts. Shaffer (1995) studied the conduct shift in the U.S. 
banking industry using 1984 as a turning point. He found a slight change in the provision of both 
loans and demand deposits. Thus, testing a possible shifting point on the regional level might lead 




The conduct of the banking industries in eight regions during the period 1972-1992 is 
tested using a relatively new industrial organization model. The findings suggest that: (l) loan 
provisions appear to have been conducted competitively in all eight regions; (2) New England 
region and the Southeast region had slight market power over the provision of demand deposits; 
(3) the Mountain region seems to have had excess capacity in providing demand deposits during 
that time; and (4) the demand deposits provision in the following five regions. Mid-Atlantic, 
Central. Midwest. Southwest and Far West. were competitive, Overally speaking. in the area of 
loan provisions, the banking industry possesses in making self-adjustments to suit the ever 
changing market demand, Banks' practice in providing loans to meet the credit needs in different 
regions is viable. In the area of demand deposit provision, the picture is fuzzier. Significant 
market power is observed in New England and Southeast region. The Mountain region appears to 
exhibit strong disequilibrium in providing demand deposits. In general, more estimates for 
different regions have a positive sign that suggests slight market power. The findings accord with 
those of Shaffer (1995), Based on the results, I conclude that the traditional banking operations, 
namely. loans and demand deposit provision are viable. 
There are a number of issues that can be addressed by future research efforts in this area, I 
mentioned studying the possible shifts of bank conduct, which can be tested by adding time 
dummies. The muiti-collinearity problem in demand specification can be corrected by using some 
rate other than the treasury bill rate, for example, the stock market interest rate, S&P 500 index, 
etc. Some variables reflecting technological changes over time can be added to the cost function. 
A longer data series can be used to gain efficiency. Another interesting topic that is worth looking 
into is the changes in conduct of the state level banking industry before and after the major 
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Description of Data 
The New England Region 
Variable 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor, in billions) 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 
Treasury bill rate 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 
log (wage rate) 
log (deposit interest rate) 

























1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 
Standard Miuimum MaximLlI!! 
Deyiation 
3.89243 5.84227 17.06541 
3.03816 3 .87718 12.61403 
0.49534 2.0333 3.56995 
0.029769 0.088268 0.18834 
0.048317 0.1093 0.25871 
0.043544 0.022892 0.17156 
5.21276 19.19585 33.35151 
0.025506 0.0346 0.1408 
0.51557 0.41865 2.19866 
0 .061578 -5.62243 -5.43424 
0.11626 -1.30518 -0.81404 
0.076868 -0.58379 -0.32322 
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ExhibitS 
Description of Data 
The Mid-Atlantic Region 
Variable M= 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor, in billions) 82.35742 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 56.14232 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 19.13057 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 0.11461 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 0.14735 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 0.076759 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 105.69341 
Treasury bill rate 0.074938 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 8.30537 
log (wage rate) -5.4766 
log (deposit interest rate) -1.00712 
log (price of physical capital) -0.44477 
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Exhibit 6 
Description of Data 
The Central Region 
Variable 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor, in billions) 
lAJans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 
Treasury bill rate 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 
log (wage rate) 
log (deposit interest rate) 
log (price of physical capital) 
















30 - ... ---- .. -,------_ .. -_ ... -
20 
.. - ............. 
10r-------__________ __ 
O~r+~r+~r+~+;_r~r+~r+~ 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
3.91223 37.39571 49.51304 
3.14072 22.93445 32.88767 
3.01247 7.05972 15.83138 
0.018702 0.065339 0.1364 
0.028798 0.09568 0.20629 
0.028562 0.015731 0.10137 
6.92872 70.97 98.05234 
0.026058 0.0346 0.1408 
0.99771 1.96639 5.51804 
0.039701 -5.62609 -5.50317 
0.11564 -1.31854 -0.86898 
0.056533 -0.64981 -0.48899 





... -_ ...... --
0.1 ~' __ -~ 
0.05 _--------
.. , ... <1 ............. ---
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Exhihit7 
Description of Data 
The Midwest Region 
Variable 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor. in billions) 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated. in billions) 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated. in billions) 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 
Annual GRP (deflated. in billions) 
Treasury bill rate 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 
log (wage rate) 
log (deposit interest rate) 
log (price of physical capital) 

















15 -- ~----­--------------10 .. - _ .... - _ .. " -- ...... -5r----__ _ 
O~_r~_r~~~_r~_r~~~~ 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
2.38102 13.9317 21.28845 
1.62588 8.01427 13.04478 
1.40146 2.87524 6.81485 
0.018585 0.076732 0.13806 
0.029457 0.097513 0.21891 
0.046258 0.015173 0.14823 
3.34482 26.25802 37.725 
0.026058 0.0346 0.1408 
0.42614 0.80738 2.06735 
0.026082 -5.59575 -5.51915 
0.095707 -1.30784 -0.94893 
0.046592 -0.62543 -0.4602 
Changes in Return on Outl 
Midwest 
0.25 
.- . ... ' ....... -0.2 
0.15 .. - .-.- -- ... -" -- ... ::..11 ,. \. 
0.1 L...----- ......... 
0.05 .."... --------" 
O~~r+~~r+~~r+~~~ 
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ExhibitS 
Description of Data 
The Southeast Region 
Varjable 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor, in billions) 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 
Treasury bill rate 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 
log (wage rate) 
log (deposit interest rate) 
log (price of physical capital) 




















_JI' _'_-"' _ ------ ,,-
... _--,,-----,,-10r-__ _________ ------___ 
O~~~++~~~~~~++~ 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 
Standard Minimym M~im:um 
Deviation 
7.44133 17.81968 38.26097 
5.78155 10.88313 25.88994 
1.30192 5.48297 9.62386 
0.017932 0.070889 0.13959 
0.032864 0.10155 0.22336 
0.028621 0.016717 0.10035 
13.483 42.4621 82.67032 
0.026058 0.0346 0.1408 
0.83385 0.99206 3.66871 
0.042434 -5.66059 -5.52575 
0.109 -1.32893 -0.91153 
0.067986 -0.72435 -0.53518 















1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 
37 
Exhibit 9 
Description of Data 
The Southwest Re!\ion 
Variable Mean 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor, in billions) 23.65847 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 14.22626 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 6.95925 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 0.10292 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 0.15508 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 0.041822 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 52.60123 
Treasury bill rate 0.074938 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 2.13364 
log (wage rate) -5.5812 
log (deposit interest rate) -1.1127 
log (price of physical capital) -0.65382 
Changes in Output Lev, 
Southwest 






".",.-" ,..-'" "-_....--,.,., ,..,....... ... 
-----
10 ,,- - _ .. " -- "'---
5 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
4.9682 15.81304 31.80424 
3.6787 9.38692 21.01658 
1.76639 4.26482 9.0655 
0.019514 0.067319 0.14087 
0.028326 0.10138 0.21296 
0.028047 0.013006 0.10252 
9.06139 33.08163 61.74459 
0.026058 0.0346 0.1408 
0.81 0.83015 3.35531 
0.041699 -5.64286 -5.51684 
0.11962 -1.39477 -0.88501 
0.060142 -0.75907 -0.54682 
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Description of Data 
The Mountain Region 
Variable 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor, in billions) 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 
Treasury bill rate 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 
log (wage rate) 
log (deposit interest rate) 
log (price of physical capital) 



















1976 19811 1984 1988 1992 
Standard Minimum MMimum 
Deyiation 
0.63297 3.74369 5.63001 
0.37968 2.43547 3.83189 
0.34896 1.01276 1.93738 
0.019333 0.073163 0.14538 
0.027601 0.09913 0.20103 
0.029713 0.017279 0.10177 
19.77358 8.4726 102.98485 
0.026058 0.0346 0.1408 
0.26513 0.44254 1.22716 
0.04131 -5.64942 -5.54143 
0.11334 -1.35522 -0.91281 
0.064224 -0.70314 -0.49567 
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Exhibit 11 
Description of Data 
The Far West Region 
variable 
Total Earning Assets 
(deflated with 1990 dollor. in billions) 35.19348 
Loans and Leases 
(deflated, in billions) 
Demand Deposits 
(deflated, in billions) 
Average annual rate of return 
on assets 
Average annual rate of return 
on loans 
Average annual rate of return 
on demand deposits 
Annual GRP (deflated, in billions) 
Treasury bill rate 
Total Cost (deflated in billions) 
log (wage rate) 
log (deposit interest rate) 
log (price of physical capital) 
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Changes in Return on Output 
Far West 
0.2 























Two-Equation Assets Model 
Output = Total Earning Assets 
t -statistic Region 
0.270666 New England 
-1.31802 Mid-Atlantic 




















































Two-Equation Assets Model 
Output = Total Loans and Leases 
t-statistic Regions 
-1.36932 New England 
1.58483 Mid-Atlantic 
3.13472 *** Central 
0.803215 Midwest 
1.64621 * Southeast 
-1.64467 * Southwest 
1.09356 Mountain 

































Four-Equation User-Cost Model 
Output 1 = Total Earniug Assets 
Variable Estimate t-statistic 
AAO 0.117 0.018925 
PI -71.0706 -2.01221 ** 
GRP 0.339765 2.5766 ••• 
TBlLL 12.3172 0.163941 
PI *GRP 2.44622 2.01455 ** 
PI'TBlLL -108.155 -1.71168* 
GRP*TBILL 0.828673 0.659169 
BAO 4.43268 3.06714 ••• 
InQI 1.49xlO-4 0.130692 
InQ2 0.021064 4.16148 *** 
InWage 0.641675 2.49716 *** 
InWdep -0.17426 -2.03906 *** 
Re¥iQns Estimate t-statistic 
New England 2.97xlO-4 0.846127 
Mid-Atlantic 0.075026 1.71908 * 
Ceno'al 0.019606 1.1783 
Midwest 1.08xlO-4 0.17903 
Southeast -5.55xlO-3 -0.59536 
Southwest -5.95xl0-4 -0.17708 
Mountain -0.792818 -2.00786 •• 
Far West 0.022667 1.29034 





For reduced form equation with Earning Assets 
R-squared 
DW (PI ) 
0.86128 
1.39181 
Output 2 = Demand Deposits 
Varaible Estimate t.statistjc 
ABO 1.45882 0.822167 
P2 -25.7808 -1.91745 ** 
GRP 0.203899 7.06133 *** 
TBlLL -9.64803 -0.450524 
P2*GRP -0.60136 -4.7945 *** 
P2*TBlLL -182.289 -1.03885 
GRP*TBlLL -0.05725 -0.170578 
BBO 2.43093 5.89478 *** 
InQ2 -2.75xlO-3 -0.957922 
InQI 7.35x lO-4 1.77611 * 
InWage 0.460588 6.27508 **. 
InWdep -0.219257 -8.85019 .*. 
Regions Estimate t.statistic 
New England 0.308244 3.72438 * •• 
Mid-Atlantic 2.47x1O-3 0.066181 
Central 0.016262 0.417159 
Midwest 0.077368 1.74713 • 
Southeast 0.116801 2.7668 * •• 
Southwest 0.028945 0.759393 
Mountain -0.642238 -3.70308 ••• 
Far West 0.034822 0.739644 














Four-Equation User-Cost Model 
Output 1 = Total Loaus 
Yariable Estimate t-statistic 
AAO 0.56559 0.145004 
PI -51.4627 -3.11055*** 
GRP 0.178839 2.28281** 
TBllL 31.3288 0.592625 
PI*GRP 1.90088 3.1881**-
P1'TBllL -132.252 -2.23575" 
GRP*TBILL 0.15969 0.17949 
BAO 3.26925 1.33827 
1nQI -1.45xlO-3 -0.539298 
InQ2 0.027082 3.39576'" 
InWage 0.406616 0.938517 
InWdep 0.111302 0.906479 
Region Estimate t-statistic 
New England 4.44xlO-4 0.318379 
Mid-Atlantic 0.091947 1.49686 
Central 0.030881 0.815897 
Midwest 2. 15xlO-3 0.74225 
Southeast -3.22xlO-3 -0.119929 
Southwest -5.38xlo-3 -0.442915 
Mountain -1.09544 -2.95683'" 
Far West 0.0387 1.15438 










Output 2 = Demand Deposits 
Varaible Estimate t-statistic 
ABO 1.89589 1.07743 
P2 -22.174 -1.63577* 
GRP 0.194443 6.88207*** 
TBllL -10.5794 -0.492801 
P2*GRP -0.610215 -5.33388*** 
P2*TBllL -283.287 -1.53862 
GRP*TBILL 0.04741 0.141305 
BBO 2.71387 5.99678'" 
InQ2 4.04x I 0-4 0.14049 
InQ1 3.63xlO-4 0.572407 
InWage 0.513657 6.3709'" 
InWdep -0.229568 -9.26049'" 
Region Estimate t-statistic 
New England 0.30916 3.67462*** 
Mid-Atlantic -0.028045 -0.74029 
Central -0.015774 -0.391822 
Midwest 0.058223 1.26445 
Southeast 0.097565 2.27458*' 
Southwest l.l 4x 10-4 2. 84E-03 
Mountain -0.678083 -3.81236'" 
Far West 0.014016 0.318722 










For t-statistics: 'significant at 0.10 level, "significant at 0.05 level, "'significant at 0.0 I level. 
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